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Abstract. The paper will attempt to show that there are many factors associated with a small 
domestic market that have a bearing on competition law and policy, and therefore competition 
regime of a small state should take these factors into account. Special reference will be made to 
Malta, where competition legislation is modelled on EU competition law. The thrust of the 
arguments put forward in this paper is not that competition rules should be discarded in small 
states or that abuse should be tolerated. The basic contention is that exceptions, normally based 
on considerations such as improved efficiency, distribution, and overall consumer benefit, are 
more likely to be relevant in small states in certain circumstances. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This paper will attempt to show that there are many factors associated with a small domestic 
market that have a bearing on competition law and policy, and therefore competition regimes of 
a small state should take these factors into account. Special reference will be made to Malta, 
where competition legislation is modelled on EU competition law. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2, which follows this introduction, lists the 
characteristics of small states which may have a bearing on competition law and policy. Section 
3 the implications for the implementation of competition law, associated with a small domestic 
market. Section 4 concludes the study by summarizing the main thrust of the arguments put 
forward in the paper. 
 
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALL STATES 
 
2.1 The Meaning of Small State  
 
The size of a country can be measured in terms of its population, its land area or its gross 
domestic product.
1
 Some studies prefer to use population size as an index of country size, while 
others take a composite index of the three variables. There is no general acceptance as to what 
constitutes a small state, although a state with a population of around 1.5 million or less would 
generally be considered as a small one.
2
 
 
So far there has not been any attempt to classify countries according to the size of their domestic 
market, although the issue has been discussed in a few studies (see for example Armstrong and 
Read, 1998; Murphy and Smith, 1999; Gal, 2002; ICN, 2009; McKoy, 2009). One possible 
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indicator could be a composite index consisting of population multiplied by real consumption 
expenditure, suitably standardised for international comparisons. Such an index would take 
account of the number of actors and the value of transactions within a given market. A cut off 
point would also be needed to establish whether a domestic market, in a given state, is to be 
considered as a small one. 
 
2.2 Small Domestic Market  
 
Small states are likely to have a small domestic market, which in turn limits competition 
possibilities, due to the ease of market dominance by firms. 
 
In addition, a small domestic market tends to be characterised by natural monopolies in utilities, 
such as electricity, fixed line telephony, gas, and water, where the relatively large overhead 
costs, with the existing technology, do not permit more than one entity to viably supply the 
service. 
 
Another characteristic of small markets relate to barriers to entry. There are natural barriers, due 
to the poor chances of success of setting new business in goods and services already supplied by 
existing firms. In addition, in a small market, bulk buying is often required to avoid excessive 
fragmentation of cargoes, especially in the case of raw materials, and this limits the number of 
players in that market. There may also be artificial barriers to entry, often imposed by 
governments, to make it viable for a business to invest in certain types of production of goods 
and services, where overhead costs are large, and hefty capital outlays are required. In many 
cases, entry is also limited in the provision of services where competition could be possible, but 
the nature of the service requires licensing. 
 
Still another characteristic of small states is parallel behaviour between firms, which tends to be 
easier to conduct where family ties predominate in business. In such circumstances, the 
competition authorities may find it difficult to distinguish between concerted practices and 
independent action.
3
 In addition, arrangements between importers and distributors involving 
restrictions with the aim of minimising intra-brand competition may be easier to put in place in 
small states. Although this is likely to stem from self-interest, it may have beneficial impacts on 
the consumer since uncontrolled competition may usher in excessive fragmentation and 
instability. This issue will be discussed further below. 
 
The size of the population has a direct bearing on the running and enforcement of competition 
law and policy. In small states, the chances of finding the necessary expertise to administer 
competition law and policy are smaller when compared to larger countries.
4
 Although smaller 
states will need a smaller number of personnel, the proportionality rule is not likely to hold, due 
to the problem of indivisibility (discussed further below), especially in matters associated with 
administration. The number of personnel and the cost of administration, per capita of population, 
are likely to be larger in small states when compared to larger states. 
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2.3 Market Failures and Externalities  
 
In a small domestic market, especially in the case of islands, it is more likely to find market 
failures, due to a number of factors, including the existence of relatively large external social and 
environmental effects. In such cases, market forces cannot be relied upon to ration supply and 
demand. In Malta, for example, business activity tends to have relatively large environmental 
impacts, due to the limited land available for development. This often leads to the need to limit 
the number of producers, permitting existing producers to continue enjoying dominance, even if 
the market, small as it may be, can take more suppliers. 
 
2.4 High cost per Capita 
 
Small states also tend to be disadvantaged due to the so-called “indivisibility” problem, which is 
associated with the inability to downscale overhead costs in proportion to the size of the 
population. This disadvantage is related to the limited ability of small states to enjoy the benefits 
of economies of scale. Because of this, many small states find it impossible to compete in certain 
those types of production that carry high overhead costs, including manufacturing.  
 
In addition, government and its institutions, being mostly overhead costs for the whole economy, 
are generally very costly for small states (Brown, 2010). This limits the country‟s ability to 
provide adequate administrative and support structures, including the regulatory institutions, to 
advance competition law and policy (McKoy, 2009). 
 
2.5 Limited Natural Resource Endowments  
 
Small country size often implies poor natural resource endowment and low inter-industry 
linkages, which result in a relatively high import content in relation to GDP (see Briguglio 
1995). In addition, there are severe limitations on import substitution possibilities (Worrell, 
1992: 9- 10). 
 
This reality often leads to domination of the market by undertakings monopolising import 
channels. One also often finds in small states a strong resistance by the existing businesses 
against parallel imports and a strong lobby for exclusive dealing arrangements, on the grounds of 
rationalisation. In Malta, for example, resistance against parallel imports was one of the main 
problems relating to the introduction of competition legislation in Malta, and after its 
introduction, there were several legal complaints by firms against parallel importers.
5
 
 
2.6 High Reliance on Export Markets  
 
A small domestic market tends to give rise to high dependence on exports (see Briguglio, 1995) 
and therefore on economic conditions in the rest of the world. A high degree of reliance on 
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exports could be a pro-competition situation, since it implies an orientation towards free trade 
and the need for competitiveness in foreign markets. However, as already explained, small size 
renders the exploitation of the advantages of economies of scale difficult, mostly due to 
indivisibilities and limited scope for specialisation, which give rise to high per unit costs of 
production. It is thus often the case that a critical size is required to enable a firm to compete in 
the international market, and again here, the argument for rationalisation, and against 
fragmentation, is a strong one. 
 
2.7 Insularity and Transport Costs  
 
Many small states are also islands, and therefore face relatively high transport costs, which are 
included in the price of imported industrial supplies and finished goods. Islands, being separated 
by sea, are constrained to use air and sea transport only for their imports and exports. Land 
transport is of course out of the question, and this reduces the options available for the movement 
of goods.  
 
High per unit cost of transport resulting from insularity may also give rise to additional problems 
such as time delays and unreliability in transport services. These create risks and uncertainties in 
production. Such disadvantages are more intense for islands that are archipelagic and dispersed 
over a wide area. 
 
Yet another problem associated with insularity is that when transport is not frequent and/or 
regular, enterprises in islands find it difficult to meet sudden changes in demand, unless they 
keep large stocks. This, in turn, leads to additional cost of production, associated with tied up 
capital, rent of warehousing and wages of storekeepers. 
 
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION LAW  
 
The characteristics of small states just described have implications associated with competition 
law and policy, notably abuse of a dominant position, agreements, mergers and enforcement of 
the law. 
 
3.1 Abuse of a Dominant Position  
 
Generally speaking, competition legislation does not take account of economic benefits when 
considering abuse of a dominant position, although dominance per se is not prohibited. In 
competition regimes modelled on Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) abuse arising from dominance, such as limiting production, applying dissimilar 
conditions, (including price discrimination to equivalent transactions), charging unfair prices and 
refusing to supply goods or services in order to eliminate a trading party from the relevant 
market, are generally prohibited, and once detected the undertakings responsible are sanctioned. 
 
There could be situations where what may be considered as abuse of dominant position in a large 
market, need not be so in a small market particularly with regard to discrimination, excessive 
pricing and foreclosure of the market, as explained below.  
 
It should be emphasized here that the arguments presented below with regard to abuse of a 
dominant position should not be interpreted as proposing a case for allowing such abuse in small 
states, but to explain that maximising consumer welfare may, in these states, require an 
economic analysis which takes into account the issue of small size. 
 
3.1.1 Dominance and discriminatory conditions 
 
Due to the small size of the domestic market, oligopolies are common in small states. In some 
cases letting dominant oligopolies indulge in discriminatory practices may be to the advantage of 
the consumer. As Gal (2001) argues, in oligopolistic markets, discriminatory pricing may work 
against rigid oligopolistic price structures and could result in lowering prices to the benefit of the 
consumers. She argues that to forbid discrimination could “reduce efficiency and slow reactions 
to changed market conduct ....Discrimination in small economies, thus, merits a deeper analysis 
of its real effects on the market.”6  
 
3.1.2 Dominance and excessive pricing 
 
Similarly, a seemingly excessive price, when compared to the price of similar products in larger 
countries, may be justified in a small economy, since this may be one way in which a firm could 
cover costs associated with importing the product, particularly in the case of islands where 
transport costs tend to be relatively high, or to cover the relatively high overhead expenses 
associated with importing small quantities or producing on a very small scale. 
 
The issue of transport costs is very important in this regard.
7
 One implication relating to 
competition law and policy is that a straightforward comparison with analogous goods in nearby 
mainland markets may not be appropriate. 
 
3.1.3 Dominance and foreclosure of the market 
 
In a small state the chances of destabilization effects of new entrants into its small domestic 
market is relatively high, when compared to a large state. In a small domestic market, a relatively 
large new entrant firm may find itself controlling a large share of the market, and this may 
seriously destabilize same market. If this same firm decides to exit at short notice, possibly 
leaving many business creditors at a disadvantage, the business environment would be further 
destabilized to the detriment of consumers. It is to be expected, in such circumstances, that 
existing firms may tend to forestall new entrants, not only because they fear that they will lose 
their share of the small market, but also to reduce the chances of instability of the same market. 
 
Although the destabilising effects of exit and entry into the market exist also in large economies, 
such effects are likely to more pronounced when the domestic market is small.  
 
This does not mean that barriers to entry should be encouraged, but that (a) the limited number of 
players that can be accommodated in a small market constrains competition possibilities and (b) 
the high degree of instability that arises by the entry and exit of a relatively large firm in a small 
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market should be given due importance when assessing consumer welfare in the context of 
competition law.  
 
3.1.4 Dominance and refusal to supply 
 
Due to the constraints of replicating infrastructural facilities, there is more scope for the 
application of the essential facilities doctrine in small states. In a small stated, a dominant firm 
may try to deny entry of new competitors into the market by refusing to share facilities. 
Competition law generally compels a dominant firm which owns a facility essential to other 
competitors, generally one that involves high overhead cost, to provide reasonable use of that 
facility.  In a small state, where infrastructural facilities are costly and difficult to replicate, 
refusal to grant third party access to essential facilities owned and controlled by a dominant firm 
should be more readily checked (Buttigieg, 1999).  
 
Thus for example, what to a German agency would not appear to be an essential facility as it 
could be replicated by a potential entrant who is just as efficient as the incumbent, in a small 
state, where sunk costs tend to be relatively high due to the indivisibility problem, the first 
entrant would be able to monopolise the sector.  
 
This means that what may not constitute refusal to grant fair access in a large country could be 
deemed an abuse of a dominant position in a small state. 
 
3.2 Implications relating to Agreements  
 
Competition legislation modelled on Article 101 of the TFEU, relating to agreements between 
undertakings, often permit restrictions in this regard, if the agreement contributes towards the 
objective of improving production or distribution of goods or services or promoting technical or 
economic progress.
8
 This is the case in Maltese Competition law. In other words agreements 
containing what may appear to be anti-competitive may be exempt if, on balance, they have an 
overall positive impact on the consumers. 
 
It may be argued that in a small state collaborative arrangements (horizontal as well as vertical 
ones) may have positive effects on the consumers, due to the advantages of business 
consolidation, given the very high incidence of micro-enterprise in such states. 
 
For example, within the EU, the Commission recognises that joint purchasing arrangements can 
often be pro-competitive because they allow smaller rivals to achieve similar purchasing 
economies to larger competitors, which can lead to enhanced competition, for example, in the 
form of lower prices and/or better quality products or services.
9
 In general, there are two main 
benefits that may be considered in permitting certain types of agreements between undertakings 
namely (a) substantial efficiency gains (e.g. through economies of scale and scope) that are 
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passed on to the consumer, and (b) intensification of supply competition through a better 
bargaining position of the firms forming the agreement.  
 
Again here, this argument should not be construed as one that unrestricted collusion is small 
states should be allowed, but that there are special circumstances, which prevail in small states, 
where the pass-on benefits are substantial.  
 
3.3 Implications relating to State Aid  
 
As is well known, in general state aid is considered as a competition distortion.
10
 However the 
EU makes several exceptions to this principle. Competition regimes based on EU General Block 
Exemption Regulation (GBER), permit public bodies in Europe to grant state aid for a broad 
range of activities for relatively high outlays without these being subject to prior European 
Commission scrutiny, in areas of research, development and innovation (RDI), regional urban 
development funds, culture and heritage conservation and infrastructures for broadband, energy 
and sports and recreational projects. The GBER covers various categories of aid measures, 
including Regional aid, Aid for SMEs, Aid for environmental protection, aid research & 
development and innovation, aid for disadvantaged workers and for workers with disabilities, 
social aid for transport for residents of remote regions [the outermost regions plus Cyprus and 
Malta), Aid for sport and multifunctional recreational infrastructure.  Generally speaking such 
aid must have an incentive effect and not be granted after a project starts. 
 
In the case of small states, especially insular ones, the case of support of these types may be 
stronger than in larger territories, given the high degree of market failure in small economies and 
the social dimension of transport in the small states that are also islands. There may therefore be 
a case for considering state aid as permitting some form of level playing field in cases where the 
small size and insularity have an important bearing on the cost of production. 
 
3.4 Mergers and Efficiency 
 
 In the case of mergers, Malta‟s Regulations on Control of Concentrations state that:  
“Concentrations that bring about or are likely to bring about gains in efficiency that will be 
greater than and will offset the effects of any prevention or lessening of competition resulting 
from or likely to result from the concentration shall not be prohibited if the undertakings 
concerned prove that such efficiency gains cannot otherwise be attained, are verifiable and likely 
to be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices, or greater innovation, choice or quality 
of products or services.”11  
 
In the Guidelines on Efficiencies, that accompanied Malta‟s Regulations on Control of 
Concentrations, it is stated that the type of efficiencies that are more likely to be cognizable and 
substantial than others, are efficiencies resulting from shifting production among facilities 
formerly owned separately, which enable the undertakings concerned to reduce the marginal cost 
of production as these are more likely to be susceptible to verification, concentration-specific, 
and substantial, and are less likely to result from anti-competitive reductions in output. Such 
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justifications to anti-competitive behaviour are found in competition regimes in certain countries, 
such as the US, Canada and Australia, where the efficiencies defence is expressly mentioned in 
the law.  
 
According to ICN (2009:31) many members of the International Competition Network: 
“… made it clear that the size of the economy may ultimately affect the economic realities 
surrounding the merger and, in turn, the final outcome of the analysis. Numerous contributors 
point out that the size of the economy may also shape procedural elements of the merger control 
regime, such as the statutory thresholds which trigger a duty by the parties to a proposed merger  
to submit a pre-merger notification filing to  be reviewed by the competition authority.”   
 
One factor that should be considered when discussing mergers in small states relates to the 
notification thresholds, in that the turnover upper limit which applies to merging undertakings 
when they notify their merger. It makes sense that such a threshold is determined in relation to 
the size of the  economy, as otherwise if set too high, all mergers will not need notification.
12
 
  
Another issue relating to mergers in a small economy is efficiency consideration. In a small 
economy, where market dominance and natural barriers to entry are common, and sometimes 
cannot be easily dismantled, efficiency clauses are likely to have more significance than in larger 
countries. In such cases, merger control that does not sufficiently acknowledge efficiencies may 
actually impede restructuring of firms, in their attempt to attain a “critical mass”. 
 
A third important issue in this regard relates to the benefits of networks. Such benefits acquire 
greater relevance in the case of sectors relating to communications and information technology. 
In such sectors, concentration could enhance consumer welfare, as otherwise consumers would 
lose the benefit that a more extensive network could generate in such sectors, including wider 
choice of complementary products and enhanced quality and service that this brings about. For 
example, in mobile telecommunications, as more users join a particular mobile network, that 
network becomes more valuable to those users as they can contact more people, in more 
locations, at lower cost as the network expands. In the transport sector, more integrated transport 
services can lead to network benefits that would improve service quality through strengthened 
hubs, better through-ticketing arrangements, more extensive services, more comprehensive and 
coherent information or better co-ordination of connecting services. 
 
The relevance of all this to small states is that the positive impact on the economy arising from 
mergers are likely to be more pronounced than in larger states, due to the fact that in a small 
market it may be desirable to avoid excessive fragmentation and encourage consolidation. 
 
4. Implications Relating to the Culture of Competition  
 
In small states, the culture of competition may not easily take root due to the fear that intense 
competition may destabilise a small fragile and thin market. Another reason is that, as already 
noted, government involvement in such states tends to loom large over the market, and public 
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undertakings often clamour for exclusion from competition law provisions claiming that they 
have a social role to play. In addition, the advantages of business consolidation and the 
disadvantages associated with business fragmentation often lead authorities of small states to 
justify monopolistic and oligopolistic structures. 
 
Furthermore even where, in small states, competition legislation is in place, its enforcement may 
be more difficult than in larger countries due to the fact that everybody knows each other, and 
social and inter-family links predominate. Thus, in small states, methods other than enforcement 
may sometimes bring better results as far as implementing competition policy is concerned. 
Competition advocacy among citizens, to render them aware of the benefits of competition 
policy are of relevance in this regard. 
 
An OECD report on the role of the competition agency states that such an agency “… must 
assume the role of competition advocate, acting proactively to bring about government policies 
that lower barriers to entry, promote deregulation and trade liberalization, and otherwise 
minimize unnecessary government intervention in the marketplace.” According to UNCTAD 
(2013) advocacy interventions are likely to be more effectively undertaken by the competition 
agency, if that agency has a stakeholder strategy, identifying the different methods and tools to 
be used for interaction with the different stakeholders. Advocacy requires reaching the 
stakeholders, central and local government bodies,  business representatives, consumer 
organizations, trade unions, professional bodies, the media, and educational establishments. In 
small states reaching these stakeholders may be easier to do than in larger states. 
 
The issue of enforcement vs advocacy is a very important consideration for small states. It is not 
being suggested here that advocacy and  enforcement contradict each other or are  mutually 
exclusive, as in many ways they are interdependent, as argued in Clark (2004), principally 
because advocacy  can  favourably  affect enforcement by fostering a competition culture,  based 
on awareness that abuses of dominance and collusion are undesirable.  Difficult as it may be in 
small state enforcement will remain important as there are always vested interests that gain from 
weak legal control. The argument proposed here is that advocacy, aimed principally to foster a 
competition culture, is of major benefit to small states as this itself encourages compliance. 
  
5. CONCLUSION  
 
This paper has highlighted a number of areas which are associated with small states and which 
are likely to have a bearing on competition law and policy. The main argument put forward in 
the paper is not that competition rules should be discarded, or that abuse should be tolerated in 
small stated. 
 
The basic contention is that exceptions, normally based on considerations such as improved 
efficiency, distribution, and overall consumer benefit, are more likely to be relevant in small 
states in certain circumstances. 
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